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STA1EMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a permissive appeal arising from two interlocutory orders entered by the
district court during Erick Hall's pending capital post-conviction proceedings.

This

Court granted Mr. Hall permission to appeal two issues: 1) whether the district court
erred in prohibiting post-conviction contact with the jurors who deliberated in the
underlying criminal case; and 2) whether the district court erred in denying Mr. Hall's
motion for a court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
A jury found Erick Virgil Hall guilty of Murder in the First Degree, Rape, and
Kidnapping in the First Degree, in Ada County Case No. H0300518. (R. 31528 Vol. IV,
pp.661-671.)! Following the special sentencing hearing held pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515,
the same jury found imposition of the penalty of death on Mr. Hall would not be unjust.
(R. 31528 Vol. I, p. 48;167.) The judgment and sentence of death were pronounced on
January 18, 2005, by the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, District Judge of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in Ada County, Boise, Idaho. (R. 31528 Vol. IV,
pp.655-660.)
On March 1, 2005, Mr. Hall filed a timely petition for post_conviction relief
pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, which initiated these capital post-conviction proceedings. (R.
35055 Vol. I, pp.9-34.) During the course of post-conviction proceedings, the district
court entered two separate orders at issue in this appeal: (l) an order prohibiting juror

! Mr. Hall respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of the record in the
underlying criminal case, Supreme Court No. 31528.
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contact, and (2) an order denying a motion to depose Glenn Elam, the investigator for

Mr. Hall's trial counsel.
The Order Prohibiting Juror Contact
On October 31,2005, Mr. Hall and the State stipulated to the release of completed
jury questionnaires, which had been provided to the parties to assist with jury selection in
the underlying criminal case. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.7l-73.)

On January 6, 2006, a

telephonic hearing was held regarding the stipulation during which the district court
permitted the release of the jury questionnaires.

In the course of discussing the

questionnaires, the district court prohibited post-conviction counsel from contacting
jurors without prior court approval. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1609; Tr. 4/09/09, p.7, L.3 p.24, L.17.)
On January 20, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion asking the district court to
reconsider its prohibition on juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp. 112-114.) On February
15, 2006, at the conclusion of the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, .the district court
prohibited Mr. Hall's counsel from contacting jurors, but stated it would entertain future
motions on the matter. (Tr. 2/15/06, pA4, L.3 - pAS, L.15.)
On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for juror contact and a memorandum in
support thereof, setting forth the legal grounds for his motion, the reasons he believed the
jurors had information relevant to his post-conviction claims, the procedures his
investigator would follow when contacting jurors, and the questions he intended to ask of
those who chose to cooperate. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.961-963; R. Vol. VIII, p.1573
(Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 12.).)

In its response, the State conceded the district

court could not prohibit all juror contact, and presented a proposed procedure for
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limiting, but not prohibiting, juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.968-984.) The district
court held a hearing on August 8, 2007, and denied the motion. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.l23, L.8p.145, L.21.) On September 13, 2007, the district court memorialized its order denying

Mr. Hall's motion for juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. VI, pp.1020-1023.)
The Order Denying The Deposition Of Mr. Hall's Investigator
On January 5, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion for discovery in which he requested
leave to depose his ·trial counsel and their investigator, Gleun Elam. (R. 35055 Vol. I,
p.JOl.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the district court granted Mr. Hall's request
to depose trial counsel but denied, without prejudice, his request to depose Mr. Elam. (Tr.
7/05/06, p.l77, L.19 -p.l81, L.21.)

On December 29, 2006, after the completion of trial counsels' depositions,
Mr. Hall filed a supplemental memorandum in support of, inter alia, a renewed motion to
depose Mr. Elam, identifYing mUltiple claims to which Mr. Elam's testimony was
relevant. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-2J.).) On January 16,2007, the
district court denied Mr. HaJJ's renewed request to depose Mr. Elam. (R. 35055, Vol. V,
p.884; Tr. 1116107, p.35, L.4 -p.36, L.2.)
On June 1,2007, Mr. HaJJ filed a sealed supplemental motion for discovery? (R.
35055 Vol. VIII, p.1572 (Exhibit 2).) On August 8, 2007, the district court again denied
the request to depose Gleun Elam, suggesting that an affidavit from Mr. HaJJ's current
counsel may be a better alternative. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.65, L20 - p.66, L5.)

The hearing on the motion was not sealed. Because the parties have not yet agreed to
unseal the motion for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Hall cites solely to the transcript of the
hearing on the motion.

2
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On September 17, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying

Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn, stating that "[n]o showing has been made by the
petitioner that [the] deposition is necessary to protect his substantial rights." (R. 35055
Vol. VI, p.l046.)
The Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For Permissive Appeal
On August 23, 2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with the
district court. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.996-1006.) Mr. Hall included an affidavit from his
investigator, Michael Shaw, in which Mr. Shaw described the content of multiple
interviews with Glenn Elarn and his unsuccessful attempts to obtain an affidavit from
Mr. Elarn. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 13, Appendix 11, pp.I-3.).)
On November 15,2007, the district court held a hearing on Mr. Hall's motion for
permission to appeal, during which the court expounded upon its reasons for denying the
deposition of Mr. Elam. (Tr. 11/15/07, p.17, L.16-p.21, L.23.)
On November 29,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with this
Court. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, pp.l570-1571.) On January 18, 2008, the district court
entered its written order denying Mr. Hall's motion for permission to appeal. (R. 35055
Vol. VIII, pp.l527-1528.) Subsequently, this Court entered an order granting Mr. Hall
permission to appeal and Mr. Hall filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII,
pp.1565-1568.) Mr. Hall has not requested any extensions of time for purposes of filing
this Appellant's Brief.
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ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court's order forbidding any communications with jurors
unless Mr. Hall can first demonstrate that such communications are necessary to
protect his substantial rights, violates his rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution?

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by forbidding Mr. Hall's attorneys
and their agents from contacting jurors?

3.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Hall's motion for a
court-ordered deposition of his trial counsels' investigator where the investigator
could provide information relevant to his post-conviction claims but was
unwilling to voluntarily provide an affidavit?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors Unless Mr. Hall
Can First Demonstrate That Any Such Communications Are Necessary To Protect His
Substantial Rights. Violates Mr. Hall's Rights Guaranteed By The First, Fifth, Eighth,
And Fourteenth Amendments To The United States Constitution

A.

Introduction
Without any evidence of unprofessional conduct by either party, the district court

took the unprecedented measure of creating a rule governing jury contact in capital postconviction proceedings.

By doing so, the district court imposed a prior restraint in

violation of the First Amendment, impeded Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and eliminated an important
procedural safeguard against the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
B.

Standard Of Review
This Court has not clearly articulated the standard of review for the district court's

order at issue in this case. However, Mr. Hall submits the appropriate standard of review
is de novo since the issue involves a question of law. Cf State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195,
197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998) ("Where this Court considers a claim that a statute is
unconstitutional, we review the trial court's ruling de novo since it involves purely a
question oflaw.")

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

6

C.

The District Court's Order Forbidding Any Communications With Jurors
Unless Mr. Hall Can First Demonstrate That Such Communications Are
Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights, Violates Mr. Hall's Rights
Under The First, Fifth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendments To The United
States Constitution

1. The District Court's Order Constitutes An Unconstitutional Prior Restraint
In Violation Of Mr. Hall's First Amendment Rights
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST.

AMEND.

I? In the

First Amendment context, "[t]he term 'prior restraint' is used to describe administrative
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the
time that such communications are to occur." Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,
550 (1993) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). In this case, the district court's
order constitutes a prior restraint because it forbids Mr. Hall's attorneys, and their agents,
from communicating with the discharged jurors without first demonstrating such
communication is necessary to protect Mr. Hall's substantial rights.
Where First Amendment interests are at stake, the Court has a duty to conduct a
searching, independent factual review of the full record. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of us., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("[A]n appellate court has an obligation to
'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure that 'the
j udgrnent does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression. '"

(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-286 (1964))). In the context
of attorney speech, a prior restraint will pass constitutional muster only if the targeted
speech presents a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative

3 The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 416 n.lO (1989).
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proceeding." Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). In applying
this standard, a reviewing court engages in a balancing of the State's interest in regulating
the targeted speech, and the attorney's interest in free speech. The balancing process
involves a four-step analysis: 1) identification of the attorney's interest in the targeted
speech; 2) identification of the State's interest in regulating the attorney's speech; 3)
whether the attorney's speech has a "substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing the
proceeding[;]" and 4) whether the regulation is "narrowly tailed" to achieve the State's
interest.fd. at 1075-76.
a. The Attorney's Interest In The Targeted Speech
Mr. Hall has a constitutional right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
See, e.g., State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing that

capital post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and
state right to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794
(Ct. App. 1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful
opportunity to have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process").
Pursuant to Idaho law, Mr. Hall essentially has one opportunity to raise all challenges to
his conviction and sentence. See, I.C. § 19-2719(4)-(6); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho
695, 700-01, 992 P.2d 144, 149-50 (1999). Mr. Hall's failure to assert a claim in his
original petition is deemed to be a waiver of any claims that were known, or should have
been known, at that time. State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677
(1991). Thus, Mr. Hall has a substantial interest in communicating with the jurors in his
case, as such communication is necessary to protect his right to meaningful postconviction proceedings. See infra Argument LC.2. In order to protect Mr. Hall's right to
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meaningful post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall's attorneys have a duty to investigate
potential juror misconduct and bias where there is reason to believe that the verdict may
be subject to legal challenge. See, e.g.,ABA Criminal Justice Section Standards, Defense

Function, Standard 4-7.3 (c)("After discharge of the jury from further consideration of the
case, ... [i]f defense counsel believes that the verdict may be subject to legal challenge,
he or she may properly, if no statute or rule prohibits such course, communicate with
jurors to determine whether such challenge may be available.").
b. The State's Interest In Regulating The Attorney's Speech
Mr. Hall concedes the State has a legitimate interest in protecting discharged
jurors from harassment, and in preserving both the freedom of juror deliberations and the
finality of verdicts. Cf Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 137 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). However, pursuit of these interests should not
undermine other substantial State interests, including the interest in promoting justice and
public confidence in the judicial process.

Accordingly, rules adopted to achieve the

State's interests should be flexible enough to accommodate any countervailing interests.

See McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268-69 (1915) ("It would not be safe to lay down
any inflexible rule because there might be instances in which such testimony of the juror
could not be excluded without violating the plainest principles of justice. This might
occur in the gravest and most important cases .... ") (internal quotes omitted».
This Court has created and adopted a series of rules and instructions designed to
afford the flexibility required to further the State's interests including the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and the Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions. (See infra Argument I.C.l.c (addressing rules and instructions in detail).) In
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the course of interpreting these rules, especially the Rules of Evidence, this Court, as well
as the Court of Appeals, has avoided a rigid interpretation of the rules, recognizing such
application may, in some instances, be counterproductive. For example, in Roll v. City of
Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 771 P.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals considered

the appropriate standard of prejudice necessary for a new trial. In rejecting an "actual
prejudice test," the court stated that "the extreme rigor" of such a test "would severely
restrict the availability of relief for [juror] misconduct, thereby diminishing public
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a verdict must
be based upon the evidence developed at the trial." Id. at 837, 771 P.2d at 58. Similarly,
this Court has refused to rigidly interpret LR.E. 606 (b) so as to completely foreclose the
admissibility of juror affidavits in the context of a constitutional violation, even if the
affidavits would be inadmissible under the plain language of the rule. State v. DeGrat,
128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996) (recognizing circumstances in which a
"constitutional exception" might apply to the exclusionary provisions of the rule).
Indeed, experience teaches that freedom of speech, even if such speech is deemed
inadmissible as a matter of law, can further the State's interest in improving the judicial
system. For example, as demonstrated in Watson v. Navistar In!'l Transp. Corp., 121
Idaho 643, 671, 827 P.2d 656, 684 (1992) (Bakes, C.J., concurring specially), and
Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 114 Idaho 503, 511, 757 P.2d 1222, 1230 (Ct. App. 1988) (Burnett,

J., specially concurring), juror affidavits that were deemed inadmissible led to
improvements in the judicial system by revealing flaws in jury instructions to be
corrected in future proceedings.
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Notably, in the absence of a rule or statute forbidding juror contact, Idaho district
courts have generally pennitted post-verdict connnunications with jurors without
incident, and in some cases, have encouraged the investigation of potential juror claims.
For example, in State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 922 P.2d 960 (1991), the district court
pennitted post-trial interviews of jurors and even authorized the defense to hire an
investigator for that purpose. Indeed, the admissibility of juror affidavits from such
interviews is a matter that Idaho district courts, as well as appellate courts, have
historically addressed without diminishing the sanctity of juror deliberations, or
otherwise undennining the public's confidence in the judicial system. See, e.g., Roberts v.
State, 132 Idaho 494, 495-496, 975 P.2d 782, 783-784 (1999) (excluding affidavits of

jurors interviewed during post-conviction investigation); State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629,
635, 38 P.3d 1285, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001) (noting that investigator contacted and
interviewed jurors post-trial in attempt to support motion for new trial); State v. Webster,
123 Idaho 233, 846 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1993) (mentioning that four jurors were contacted
post-trial); Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,827 P.2d 656 (1992)
(recognizing that a party "has no way of knowing whether a verdict was [impennissibleJ
until some of the jurors are interviewed.").
In conclusion, Mr. Hall concedes the State has an interest in regulating attorney
speech. However, the State has an equally important interest in promoting justice and
public confidence in the judicial process which can be frustrated by over-regulating
attorney speech. Thus, when reviewing the prior restraint imposed by the district court,
Mr. Hall submits the Court should continue its practice of weighing all of the interests at

stake, in light of the experience and practice in Idaho courts.
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c. The Targeted Speech Does Not Present A Substantial Likelihood Of
Materially Prejudicing The Proceeding
The district court's order targets all communications Mr. Hall's attorneys might
have with jurors, without regard for whether th'e communications have a "substantial
likelihood of materially prejudicing" the proceedings. Gentile v. State Bar o/Nevada, 501
U.S. 1030, 1075-76 (1991) (holding attorney's pretrial statements to the press were
protected speech because they did not present a "substantial likelihood of materially
prejudicing" the legal process). In fact, the district court never explicitly addressed
whether Mr. Hall's proposed communications presented a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing the proceedings. (R. 35055 Vol. VI, pp.l020-1023.)
Mr. Hall submitted a proposed list of general topics and specific questions for
jurors who were willing to discuss their service, which he supported with citations to the
record and applicable law. (R. 35055, Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit
12.).) In rejecting Mr. Hall's request, the district court's order implicitly assumes that
Mr. Hall's attorneys will act unprofussiomilly if left to their own devices. (See infra
Argument II.) However, until established otherwise, all Idaho attorneys are presumed to
be capable of exercising professional discretion.

As stated in the Idaho Rules of

Professional Conduct:
[M]any difficult issues of professional discretion can arise. Such issues
must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. These
principles include the lawyer's obligations, as an advocate, to
zealously protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests within the
bounds of the law and, as an officer of the court, to preserve the
integrity of the legal system's search for the truth while maintaining a
professional, courteous and civil attitude toward all persons involved
in the process .... Lawyers playa vital role in the preservation of society.
The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their
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relationship to our legal system. The Rules of Professional Conduct, when
properly applied, serve to define that relationship.
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities (2004)
(emphasis added).
Even if the district court were justified in assuming ill intent or overzealousness
on the part of Mr. Hall's attorneys, this Court has already adopted three safeguards
designed, in part, to minimize the likelihood of any potential prejudice to the
proceedings. These safeguards are reflected in the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Idaho Rules of Evidence.
First, this Court has promulgated Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction (lCJl) number
232, which provides as follows:
The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with
the attorneys or with anyone else. For your guidance, the Court instructs
you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely
your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you wish to,
but you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the
case with anyone at all. If you choose to, you may tell them as much or as
little as you like, but you should be careful to respect the privacy and
feelings of your fellow jurors. Remember that they understood their
deliberations to be confidential. Therefore, you should limit your
comments to your own perceptions and feelings. If anyone persists in
discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, please report it to
me.
ICJI No. 232 (emphasis added). This instruction recognizes the permissibility of postverdict juror contact, while reducing the risk of juror harassment by empowering jurors to
decide for themselves whether to talk to the attorneys.
A second safeguard adopted by this Court is contained in the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct (IRPC). In relevant part, Rule 3.5 provides that, "A lawyer shall
not ... communicate with a juror or prospective juror after discharge of the jury if:
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(1) the communication is prohibited by law or conrt order; (2) the juror has made known
to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the commnnication involves
misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment." IRPC 3.5(c).

The relevant

commentary to this rule states that:
A lawyer may on occasion want to communicate with a juror or
prospective juror after the jury has been discharged. The lawyer may do so
nnless the communication is prohibited by law or a court order but must
respect the desire of the juror not to talk with the lawyer. The lawyer may
not engage in improper conduct during the commnnication.
IRPC 3.5, Commentary,

~

3.

Thus, this rule recognizes the permissibility of juror

contact, while minimizing the risk of juror harassment and manipUlation, by setting forth
specific rules that Idaho attorneys must observe when communicating with discharged
Jurors.
A third safeguard adopted by this Court is contained in Rule 606(b) of the Idaho
Rules of Evidence.
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon the juror's or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith, nor maya juror's affidavit or evidence
of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifYing be received for these purposes ....
I.R.E. 606 (b). Pursuant to this rule, a juror's affidavit generally carmot be used to
impeach the jury verdict, subject to at least four exceptions. The first three are contained
in the rule itself, which provides:

[AJ juror may testifY on the questions whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror and may
be questioned about or may execute an affidavit on the issue of whether or
not the jury determined any issue by resort to chance.
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I.R.E. 606(b). The plain language of this rule assumes juror interviews are pennissible,
but simply restricts the admissibility of the fruits of such interviews.
The fourth "exception" is essentially a recognition by this Court that not
everything a juror has to say falls within the scope of Rule 606(b). As this Court has
stated:
The role of I.R.E. 606(b) is to guide a court in detennining what evidence
may be considered by the court to impeach a verdict. That rule, however,
does not have application to infonnation brought forth which challenges
other conduct of jurors during the trial, apart from their deliberations.
Levinger v. Mercy Medical Center, 139 Idaho 192, 197, 75 P.3d 1202, 1207 (2003)

(holding that a juror's affidavit demonstrating dishonesty during voir dire was admissible
because dishonesty during voir dire occurs prior to deliberations). This "exception"
recoguizes that some errors may be addressed by juror affidavits if adequate safeguards,
such as a meaningful voir dire, were not observed during the trial process. See State v.
DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996).

Thus, I.RE. 606(b), and the cases interpreting it, implicitly recognize the
propriety of conducting juror interviews.

Indeed, experience and common sense

demonstrate that juror contact may be the only means of identifying claims for which
juror affidavits are admissible to support.
Moreover, in all cases where a litigant has an interest in contacting jurors, this
Court has already adopted at least three independent safeguards which effectively
minimize the likelihood of juror harassment, manipulation, and unwarranted intrusion
into the jury's deliberative process.
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communications with jurors did not present a substantial likelihood of prejudicing the
post-conviction proceedings.
d. The District Court's Order Is Not Narrowly Tailored To Achieve The
State's futerest
The rule in Gentile pennitting restrictions on an attorney's ability to make pretrial
statements to the press was narrowly tailored, Le., written to apply only to such speech
that was substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect on the proceedings.
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1076. In contrast, the district court's order prohibiting juror contact

in this case is not narrowly tailored because it prohibits constitutionally protected
communications designed to assist Mr. Hall in identifying and supporting legitimate
claims for post-conviction relief. (See supra Argument LC.l.(a) and (c).) By its breadth
and burden, the district court's order effectively precludes Mr. Hall from conducting any
meaningful investigation of juror misconduct claims, or for that matter, any other claims
that could be supported by juror affidavits.
The district court reasoned that because the jury was instructed to consider only
the evidence presented at trial, any post verdict communications with jurors regarding
potential claims of juror misconduct, or bias, were unnecessary. (R. 35055 Vol. VI,
pp.l020-1023.) Presuming the jury followed the district court's instructions may be
relevant in determining whether a juror's affidavit is admissible, State v. DeGrat, 128
Idaho 352, 355, 913 P.2d 568, 571 (1996), but applying this presumption to justify an
order precluding juror contact, goes too far. The fact is that juror misconduct does occur,
despite thorough jury instructions and admonishments. 4 Even in the absence of juror

The most common types of juror misconduct involve juror exposure to matters not
properly admitted into evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Maree & Brooks, 934 F.2d

4
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misconduct, juror interviews might reveal information that leads to other potential claims
for post-conviction relief. 5

Mr. Hall submits his attorney's speech is already effectively regulated through the
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, in conjunction with other rules of the Court.
However, even if the current framework is deemed insufficient to achieve the State's
interests, the district court's order is not narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes
to address the State's interests. For instance, the district court failed to consider any
reasonable time, place, and mauner restrictions, including but not necessarily limited to
the following: 1) requiring that notice be given to the opposing party of the attorney's
intent to contact jurors; 2) requiring that written documentation be provided to jurors
identifying the attorneys or their agents, advising jurors of their right to refuse to
communicate, or to terminate communications at any time, and reminding jurors to
respect the privacy of other jurors; 3) requiring that juror interviews be recorded; and
4) requiring that any juror affidavits be filed under seal to provide the district court an
opportunity to assess its admissibility before disclosing its contents to the public.

196 (9th Cir. 1991) (reversing conviction because juror discussed the case with friends
who said that people like the defendant should be incarcerated); Stockton v. Virginia, 852
F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988) (reversing a death sentence because sequestered jurors were
told, by the owner of the restaurant where they were taken for lunch, to "fry that son of a
bitch."); United States v. Kum Seng Seo, 300 F.2d 623 (3rd Cir. 1962) (reversing
conviction because juror introduced news accounts of defendant's high bail and drugs
found in the defendant's room).
5 For instance, jurors might provide information regarding irregularities or inadequacies
during voir dire. If a juror was not asked about relevant background matters or exposure
to pretrial publicity, this information may develop into an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, rather than a jury misconduct claim. Jurors can also provide information
about potentially prejudicial events in the courtroom, such as whether they observed the
defendant in shackles or prison garb.
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In conclusion, considering Mr. Hall's interests, the State's interests, the
improbability that the targeted speech will materially prejudice the proceedings, and the
over breadth of the order, the district court's order cannot pass constitutional muster
under the First Amendment.
2. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Due Process Right To
Meaningful Post-Conviction Proceedings
Mr. Hall has a due process right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings. See
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,401(1985) ("[W]hen a State opts to act in a field where its

action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless act in accord with the
dictates of the Constitution--and, in particular, in accord with the Due Process Clause.");
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862; 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing that capital

post-conviction proceedings serve to protect a condemned person's federal and state right
to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App.
1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to
have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"); see generally I.C. §
19-4901 et seq., and I.C. § 19-2719. As noted in Claim I.C. (7)(a), supra, incorporated
here by reference, Mr. Hall's attorneys have an obligation to conduct an independent and
thorough investigation to protect his right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
Mr. Hall did not require and did not request the district court's intervention to conduct
juror interviews.

Rather, the district court sua sponte interfered with Mr. Hall's

independent investigation and, by entering its order, effectively prevented him from
conducting a meaningful post-conviction investigation.
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3. The District Court's Order Violates Mr. Hall's Right To Meaningful PostConviction Proceedings In A Capital Case As Guaranteed By The Due
Process Clauses And The Eighth Amendment To The U.S. Constitution
Because this is a capital case, Mr. Hall is entitled to heightened, not lessened,
procedural safeguards. See Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 539-540 (9th Cir. 2001)
(recognizing the "long line of cases requiring heightened procedural safeguards in capital
cases"); Lanliford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-27, (1991) (weighing the "special
importance of fair procedure in the capital sentencing context"); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982) (discussing heightened protections in capital cases); Beck v.
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (noting the Court's "often stated" principle that "there is a

significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments'');
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (finding that "the penalty of death is

qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisomnent").
The ability to conduct a meaningful post-conviction investigation, including the
ability to communicate with jurors, provides an additional safeguard against the arbitrary
and capricious imposition of the death penalty. Indeed, considering Mr. Hall's case was
one of the first capital jury sentencing cases in Idaho, the importance of obtaining juror
feedback about their experience is substantial.

The district court's order effectively

abolished this important safeguard without sufficient justification. See supra Claim IC
(I)(b). For these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully submits the district court's order violates
the Due Process and Eighth Amendment right to heightened protections in capital cases.
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D.

Conclusion
The district court inserted itself into the area of juror contact, an area that has

largely been self-regulated by the legal profession through the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct, court rules, and case law. It impugns the integrity of the Idaho
legal profession to presume attorneys and their agents will act in violation of their ethical
duties; such a presumption is not warranted by experience. Moreover, by crafting its
unprecedented order, the district court unnecessarily infringed on Mr. Hall's rights to free
speech, to meaningful post-conviction proceedings, and to the additional safeguards
afforded capital defendants. For all of these reasons, Mr. Hall respectfully requests this
Court vacate the district court's order prohibiting juror contact, and remand his case for
further proceedings that will allow his attorneys to conduct a meaningful post-conviction
investigation on his behalf.
II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forbidding Mr. Hall's Attorneys And Their
Agents From Contacting Any Of The Jurors
A.

Introduction
The district court interfered with Mr. Hall's independent investigation for

potential post-conviction claims, and the gathering of evidence to support such claims, by
sua sponte prohibiting his counsel from contacting any of the jurors from the underlying

case without prior court approval. When Mr. Hall obeyed the district court's directive
and filed a motion to permit juror contact, the district court improperly treated the motion
as a request for discovery. As noted above, the district court's conduct is unprecedented
and unconstitutional. Assuming arguendo the district court had the authority to enter its
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order, Mr. Hall met the standard established by the court. Accordingly, the district court
abused its discretion in denying any juror contact.
B.

Standard Of Review
As noted above, the district court lacked authority to enter the order. Assuming

arguendo the district court had authority to enter the order, the order should be reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. When reviewing a discretionary decision, this
Court determines "(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600,
768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Forbidding Mr. Hall's Attorneys
And Their Agents From Contacting Any Of The Jurors
On October 27, 2004, the jurors in the underlying capital case concluded their

service with the entry of their special verdicts at the conclusion of the penalty phase of
Mr. Hall's trial. (R. 31528 Vol. IV, pp.609-12.) Upon completion of their service, the
district court discharged the jurors, instructing them as follows:
The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with
anyone else. For your guidance the Court instructs you that whether you
talk to anyone is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss
this case if you wish to, but you are not required to do so and you may
choose not to discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to speak
to anyone about the case you may tell them as much or as little as you like,
but you should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your
fellow jurors. Remember that they understood that their deliberations
were to be confidential, therefore you should limit your contact, if any, to
your own perception and feelings. If anyone persists in discussing this
case over your obj ection, or becomes critical of your service, either before
or after any discussion has begun please report that to me.
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(Tr. 31528, p. 5526, Ls.2-l9(emphasis added).) 6
After the initiation of the post-conviction proceedings, the parties entered a
stipulation for the release of completed juror questionnaires from the underlying criminal
case. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.7l-73.)

A telephonic hearing was held regarding the

stipulation, during which the district court permitted the release of the jury
questionnaires. In the course of discussing the questionnaires, the district court sua sponte
prohibited post-conviction counsel from contacting jurors without prior court approval.
(R 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1609; Tr. 4/09/09, p.7, L.3 - p.24, L.17,f

Two weeks later, Mr. Hall moved the district court to reconsider its prohibition on
juror contact. (R. 35055 Vol. I, pp. 112-114.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the
district court prohibited Mr. Hall's counsel from contacting jurors, but stated it would
entertain future motions. (Tr. 2/15/06, pA4, 1.3 -pAS, LIS.)

6 Notably, the district court's instruction deviated from this Court's pattern instruction set
forth in ICJI No. 232, by omitting reference to post-verdict discussions with attorneys.
(See supra Argument LC.(l)(c) (quoting ICn No. 232 in its entirety).) This Court has
entered an Order regarding the use of ICJI, providing in relevant part that:

It is recommended that whenever these revised Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions contain an instruction applicable to a case and the trial judge
determines that the jury should be instructed on that subject, the judge
should use the instruction contained in the revised Idaho Criminal Jury
Instructions, unless the judge finds that a different instruction would more
adequately, accurately or clearly state the law.
See Order dated October 25, 2005, at. http://www.isc.idaho.gov/cji_orderl005.htm (last
accessed on June 19,2009).
7 As reflected during the hearing on Mr. Hall's objection to the record, there is some
conflict regarding the nature and scope of the discussions during the January 6, 2006
hearing. Mr. Hall asserts that absent an affirmative waiver of the recording requirement,
the district court erred in failing to record the proceedings. To the extent the State or the
Court relies on the January 6, 2006 hearing to affirm the district court's rulings on the
jury contact issue, Mr. Hall asserts he has been denied his right to a meaningful appeal
due to the district court's failure to record that hearing.
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On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for juror contact and a memorandum in

support thereof, which included the legal grounds for his motion, the reasons he believed
the jurors had information relevant to his post-conviction claims, the procedures his
investigator would follow when contacting jurors, and the questions he intended to ask of
those who chose to cooperate. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.961-963; R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573
(Certificate of Exhibits, Exhibit 12.).)
On June 15, 2007, the parties addressed the recent filings and the district court
heard the motion for juror contact on August 8, 2007. (Tr. 6/15/07, pA, Ln.9 - p.5, Ln.7.)
During the hearing, the district court gave some insight into its analysis of the issue.
I had an experience in a case I presided over, a rape case, early in my time
as a District Judge, probably the '95, '96 time frame, where counsel sent
out a private investigator named Peter Smith who showed up on people's
doorsteps unannounced. And I - madam clerk received two or tluee
phone calls from rather upset individuals, citizens, who had served as
jurors in that case, including the jury foreman, as I recall, who was a
fellow in his mid-fifties. He was no wallflower. He was a senior bank
executive, as I recall. And they were genuinely upset and surprised and
dismayed to have this happen. It kind of reinforced my view that it is
important to protect the privacy of jurors who serve on difficult cases and
that absent some extraordinary reason - and I don't think death penalty
cases automatically qualifY as extraordinary reason - that this Court
should go to reasonable lengths to ensure that their expectation in the
courts when I send them away is met. We are not talking about fragile
widows or fragile old men in nursing homes who are upset when after
their service, they go into a nursing home and they are disturbed by this.
We are talking about people in - at the top of their game, at the prime of
their life, in their highest eamings capacity. I'm thinking of the banking
executive who served as the foreman - being genuinely upset by this. And
it was beyond rude. It was a very unpleasant surprise and upsetting,
disturbing to the point where this individual called and others did the same
thing. Now I will not tell you that I have high regard for Peter Smith. I
have said that he is sleazy. I've said that on the record in multiple cases
and it's true. It's my view, based on what he did in that case and others.
He is profane. He is unprofessional. He's sleazy. No other way to say it.
So he was involved in that case. So maybe by virtue of his participation in
that case we got a reaction that was unusually strong, compared with
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maybe what somebody else would get who volunteered in response to a
letter from the Court.

You are told all of that and you walk out of here as a citizen juror and you
think you've served and it might have been the first time in your life and it
was a major imposition in your life in terms of time and energy away from
your family, your professional life, whatever. And then you get a someone showing up on your doorstep and boy, you know, it was a very
unpleasant surprise and very disappointing to them and then, because of
that, ultimately to me. So that's the background against which you are
urging me to allow this process, Mr. Ackley. I do not presume because
your client has - the petitioner in this case is the subject of a death penalty
verdict that he automatically qualifies for this kind of contact. In my
view, it's firm that he does not automatically by virtue of that. So kind of
just to let you know, I've been around longer than some judges and less
than others. I think that Judge Bail has been around here active longer
than I have. So this is just based on my experience. Other judges may see
this differently and they are certainly free to and I would defer to their
view - views in this area. But this is what my experience has been and
this is part of the reason why I am admittedly somewhat protective of
jurors who have served.
(Tr. 6/15/07, p.21, L.5 - p.25, L.3.)
At this hearing, Mr. Hall further expounded on the procedures he would utilize
when contacting jurors and submitted an example of a letter his investigator would
provide to any of the jurors contacted. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 16.).) The
district court addressed Mr. Hall's motion and arguments, and once again referenced his
negative experiences with an unethical investigator. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.l23, L.8 - p.l28,
L.23.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court orally denied Mr. Hall's motion
and, a month later, memorialized the denial in a written order. (Tr. 8/08/07, p.145, L.8p.l45, L.21.) In denying Mr. Hall's motion, the district court found Mr. Hall had failed
to demonstrate juror contact was necessary to protect his substantial rights. The district
court erred by adopting what is essentially a discovery standard for juror contact.
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Mr. Hall did not ask the court to order jury interviews through discovery or otherwise
facilitate his contact with jurors. Thus, the district court's reliance on its authority to
govern discovery is misplaced. Moreover, Mr. Hall submits that absent any evidence his
attorneys or their agents committed (or intended to commit) misconduct, the district court
exceeded its authority by entering its order. Indeed, it appears the district court was not
relying on the experience in Mr. Hall's case, but on its own experience with an unethical
investigator in a completely different case. Finally, Mr. Hall submits the district court
violated Idaho law by effectively interpreting I.R.E. 606(b) in a manner not supported by
existing law, and by creating a new rule, which abridged Mr. Hall's rights under the plain
language of the rule and impeded his substantive right to conduct an independent and
thorough post-conviction investigation. Under Idaho law, it is the sole province of the
Idaho Supreme Court to create rules governing the practice and procedure in all Idaho
courts, including the Idaho Rules of Evidence. IDAHO CONST. ART. V, § 2; Idaho Code §
1-212. Such rules cannot be interpreted by inferior courts to "abridge, enlarge or modify
the substantive rights of any litigant." I.C. § 1-213.
D.

Conclusion
The district court's prohibition on juror contact without prior court approval

interfered with Mr. Hall's independent post-conviction investigation. Moreover, when
Mr. Hall obeyed the district court's order and filed a motion to permit juror contact, the
district court improperly treated the motion as a request for discovery.

Assuming

arguendo the district court had the authority to enter such an order, Mr. Hall submits he
met the standard established by the court.
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discretion in denying Mr. Hall's request for juror contact and he respectfully requests that
the district court's order be vacated and the case remanded for further investigation.

III.
The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered Deposition
Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An Abuse Of Discretion
Where Mr. Hall Has Demonstrated That A Deposition
Is Necessary To Protect His Substantial Rights
A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Hall's motion to depose his

trial counsels' investigator, Glenn Elam. Mr. Hall provided a statement of claims in his
petition to which Mr. Elam's testimony was relevant and necessary to establish the scope
of the investigation conducted in relationship to these claims. Under the circumstances of
this case, Mr. Hall SUbmits the requested discovery was mandatory.

Alternatively,

Mr. Hall submits that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for
Mr. Elam's deposition because the Court's denial was based on misapplication of the
relevant law and facts.
B.

Standard Of Review
Post-conviction discovery is left to the discretion of the district court unless the

petitioner can show that discovery is necessary to protect his substantial rights.
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001) ("Unless discovery is

necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district court is not required to
order discovery."); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999).
Accordingly, the district court's order denying Mr. Hall's motion for discovery is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
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C.

The District Court's Order Denying Mr. Hall's Motion For A Court-Ordered
Deposition Of His Trial Counsels' Investigator, Glenn Elam, Constitutes An
Abuse Of Discretion

Mr. Hall has a constitutional right to meaningful post-conviction proceedings.
See, e.g., State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891, 893 (1992) (recognizing
capital post-conviction proceedings protect a condemned person's federal and state right
to due process); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App.
1999) ("failing to provide a post-conviction applicant with a meaningful opportunity to
have his or her claims presented may be violative of due process"). This right is hollow
if there is not a meaningful opportunity to develop a factual basis for all post-conviction
claims. In some cases, petitioners must resort to court-ordered discovery to develop
factual support for their claims. Mr. Hall identifies here the complete history of his
attempts to obtain court ordered discovery, beginning with his motion for discovery filed
nearly three and a half years ago.
On January 5, 2006, Mr. Hall filed a motion for discovery in which he requested
leave to conduct the depositions of his trial counsel and their investigator, Glenn Elam.
(R. 35055 Vol. I, p.lOI.) At the hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the district court granted

the request to depose trial counsel but denied, without prejudice, his request to depose
Mr. Elam. (Tr. 7/05/06, p.l77, L.19 - p.l81, L.21; R. 35055, Vol. V, p.884.)
On December 29, 2006, after completion of trial counsels' depositions, Mr. Hall
filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion for discovery in which he
identified multiple claims to which Mr. Elam's testimony was relevant. (R. 35055 Vol.
VIII, p.l573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-21.).) Most notably, Mr. Hall raised a claim that his trial
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counsel failed to investigate an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator defense. (R. 35055
Vol. II, p.152.) In his Amended Petition, Mr. Hall asserted the following:
During these post-conviction proceedings, Petitioner has
established that the DNA evidence actually shows that there was more
than one perpetrator involved in the crime of rape. (Exhibit 8.) Petitioner
has always maintained, and continues to maintain, that he did not kill
Ms. Heuneman. Petitioner asserts that the secondary contributor to the
DNA may have been the actual killer. During the course of this
reinvestigation, Petitioner has identified one possible person as the source
for the DNA evidence not yet matched. That person, Patrick Hoffert, is
deceased.
According to police reports, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill told
Detective Dave Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office
that they had seen and spoken with Lynn Henneman near the Greenbelt on
the night she was abducted. (Exhibit 9.) Ms. Lewis indicated that
Ms. Henneman asked for their assistance on directions to the DoubleTree
Inn. According to Ms. Lewis, Petitioner and Patrick Bernard Hoffert then
arrived, at which point Petitioner spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. Ms. Hill
reported noticing Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and recalled that
Petitioner left with Ms. Henneman.
The State did not call either Ms. Lewis or Ms. Hill to testify
despite that fact that on the surface, their testimony would appear
incriminating of Petitioner. The reason the State did not call these
witnesses is because there is more to the story. Specifically, the morning
after Ms. Henneman's abduction, Patrick Hoffert, the other individual
placed with Ms. Henneman the night before, committed suicide. (Exhibit
10.) An investigation was conducted both by the Garden City Police
Department and the coroner's office.
Through reinvestigation of this case, Petitioner has obtained the
affidavits of Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill, who confirm the information in the
police reports. (Exhibit II, Exhibit 12.) Further, Ms. Lewis indicates that
Deirdre Muncy, Patrick Hoffert's former girlfriend, told her that prior to
committing suicide Patrick stated that, "he raped the girl."s When
Ms. Lewis attempted to bring this information to the attention of the
Garden City Police, she was told to mind her own business. Ms. Lewis
also indicates that several years later she positively identified the woman
she met as Lynn Henneman through a photographic array given to her by
Detective Dave Smith of the Boise Police Department. Ms. Hill was also
contacted by Detective Smith, but with no follow-up. This information
does not appear in trial counsels' files and was not presented at the trial.

Deirdre Muncy denied this assertion, but that alone, does not make the evidence
inadmissible or irrelevant at a capital sentencing proceeding, especially in light of the
other odd circumstances involving Mr. Hoffert that remain.
8
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Petitioner cannot fully state this claim as he is still investigating
the degree of information known but withheld by the State and further is
awaiting a hearing and ruling on his Motion For Discovery, filed January
5,2006.
(R. 35055 Vol. I, pp.190-92.)
Mr. Hall also cited the relevant deposition testimony of his trial counsel as a

justification to depose Mr. Elam. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, pp.20-21.).)
For instance, lead trial counsel, Ami! Myshin, testified he believed Mr. Elam conducted
interviews based on the police reports, and therefore assumed Mr. Elam interviewed
Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis. (Tr. 9/14/06, p.8, Ls.16-23; p.69, L.2 - p.72, L.23; p.73,
Ls.21 - p.74, L.17.) However, co-counsel, D.C. Carr, testified the defense did not learn
about the Hoffert incident until it was too late, Le., after trial and sentencing had
concluded. (Tr. 9113/06, p.216, L.3 - p.220, L.15.) Elsewhere Mr. Carr testified the
defense discussed whether to pursue an alternate perpetrator or co-perpetrator theory
based on Patrick Hoffert, suggesting the defense was indeed aware of the possible Hoffert
connection prior to trial. (Tr. 9/13/06, p.221, L.16 - p.225, L.1O.) Thus, Mr. Carr's
testimony was not only interually inconsistent, but also seemingly inconsistent with
Mr. Myshin's testimony. Accordingly, Mr. Hall asserted that "[b]ased on the underlying
record and the depositions of both Mr. Myshin and Mr. Carr ... it is imperative he be
allowed to depose" their investigator. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (Exhibit 10, p.20).)
On January 16, 2007, the district court heard Mr. Hall's renewed motion. The
transcript from that hearing provides, in relevant part, as follows:
THE COURT: But the claim is to ineffective assistance of counsel, not of
their investigator. The investigators are only helpful to the extent that they
bring information -- pro or con to anybody's point of view -- to their
principal, to the trial attorney.
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MS. SWENSEN: Mr. Elam, though, would be critical, Your Honor, in
establishing many of the factual bases for our ineffective assistance of
counsel claims. For example, if we say that trial counsel failed to
investigate, it's not enough just to talk to trial counsel if their response is,
well, Mr. Elam did that.

MR. BOURNE: ... if they've got questions, it seems to me that they
can put it together into an affidavit that Mr. Elam can sign, if he's
cooperative, and they can ask him questions, and he can say, yes, I spoke
to this person, and this person gave me this information, or, no, I didn't
speak to this information (sic) and save us three more days oflawyer time
- well, I mean, collectively.

THE COURT: I'm going to deny the request with respect to the public
defender's office investigator. He has been cooperative. I think it is
It would likely result in
simply unnecessary to depose him.
substantial additional delay, and there are alternatives to it. To be
honest, the sets of investigators that we have in this county, that I'm
familiar with -- both for the prosecutor's office and for the public
defender's office -- are honorable and competent individuals. . .. Part of
what I'm considering is, it is difficult enough for trial counsel to go
through a deposition on a case with this much import, if you will, without
requiring investigators to do the same thing. And I'm just not -- I think
that's a layer and a level to which it is simply not necessary to go. And
that's a small part of my thinking, but a part nonetheless.
(Tr. 1/16/07, p.32, 1.18 - p.36, 1.2 (emphasis added).) Thus, both the State and the
district court suggested an affidavit from Mr. Elam, in lieu of a deposition, would be an
appropriate alternative, on the assumption that Mr. Elam would be cooperative.
On June 1,2007, Mr. Hall filed a sealed supplemental motion for discovery.9 (R.
35055 Vol. VIII, p.l572 (Exhibit 2).)

On August 8, 2007, the district court heard

Mr. Hall's motion. During that hearing, Mr. Hall's counsel informed the court Mr. Elam

The hearing on the motion was not sealed. Because the parties have not yet agreed to
unseal the motion for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Hall cites solely to the transcript of the
hearing on the motion.

9
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would not sign an affidavit without the consent of Mr. Myshin, and that, to date, they had
not been able to obtain such consent. As a result, Mr. Hall was moving for a courtordered deposition. (Tr. 8/16/07, p.61, L.19 - p.63, L.10.) The transcript from that
hearing provides, in relevant part, as follows:
MR. ACKLEY: ... That was our goal, is simply to ask for an affidavit,
rather than do a deposition. So it's really kind of come to this.

MR. BOURNE: ... I think their investigator could supply his own
affidavit of what Glenn Elam said, and that would place in motion my
ability to speak to Mr. Elam and confirm that their investigator's affidavit
is correct. ...
THE COURT: Last word?
MR. ACKLEY: Actually, we're fine with that. Our only concern was
whether that would be objected to on admissibility grounds. But I'm
hearing the State wouldn't have an objection to us attaching that to our -either submitting it ahead of time or attaching it to our final petition.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know that the State has committed too
much, except to say that you have the option, Mr. Ackley, of submitting
an affidavit from Mr. Shaw. I'm not sure I heard them say about whether
they would be objecting to hearsay with it or not.
MR. ACKLEY: Okay. Well, I just simply wouldn't want to delay this
process so that we submit an affidavit from Mr. Shaw and then the State
objects to compelling depositions, and then in addition says, "By the way,
depositions at this point are just going to delay the case even further." So
our preference would be for the Court to order depositions. And if that
doesn't compel the cooperation, that would resolve the need for
depositions, then at least we have this process moving now rather than
having us file an affidavit first and then the State speaking to Mr. Elam or
Mr. Myshin about this and us coming back ad saying this is where we are
and the State objects to depositions and objects to Mr. Shaw's affidavit.
I'm just trying to cut through some of that. That happens way too often
and then delay gets blamed on petitioner for that kind of thing. So our
motion is really for the depositions ....
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THE COURT: '" I'll deny the motion to compel an affidavit -- I'm sorry,
compel a deposition of the Ada County public defender's office
investigator, Mr. Glenn Elam. He is - it's obvious he's not a decisionmaker on what evidence was introduce or known or not known, known
about and not introduced.... And I think an affidavit of Mr. Shaw may
be an alternative.
(Tr. 8/08/07, p.63, L.I0 -p.66, L.5 (emphasis added).)
On August 23, 2007, Mr. Hall filed a motion for permission to appeal with the
district court. (R. 35055 Vol. V, pp.996-1006.) Mr. Hall included with the motion an
affidavit from his investigator, Michael Shaw, in which Mr. Shaw described multiple
interviews with Glenn EJam. In relevant part, Mr. Shaw stated the following:
Mr. Elam said there were some strange facts in the case that stood out in
his mind involving a man who lived near the place Lynn Henneman's
. body was found in Garden City.
Mr. Elam said the man and his wife argued in their trailer around the night
the body was discovered, and that when she left that night to go buy beer,
he killed himself with a gun. Mr. Elam said the man and his wife were
acquaintances of Erick Hall. Mr. Elam told me he never found the wife
but had always wanted to interview her.
Mr. Elam also told me he made audio recordings of interviews with a
couple of people who told him they saw Lynn Henneman when she was
lost in Garden City and asking for directions on the night of her
disappearance.

I reviewed an August 12,2004 audio recording Mr. Elam made of a 27.5
minute interview with Lisa Lewis. . .. Ms. Lewis describes the person she
saw in Garden City on September 24, 2000 as Lynn Henneman, and says
she has no doubts about her identification because she subsequently saw
photographs of Ms. Henneman on television when she was reported
missing.
Approximately six minutes into the interview, Mr. Elam asks Ms. Lewis
why she thinks Mr. Hoffert committed suicide. Ms. Lewis says she heard
Deidre Muncie state that Mr. Hoffert had raped a girl. Approximately
seventeen minutes into the interview, Ms. Lewis again states Ms. Muncie
told her Mr. Hoffert raped a girl, and that Ms. Muncie said this repeatedly.
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Mr. Elam indicated in the recording that Ms. Lewis would be
subpoenaed to testify at Erick Hall's trial.

Mr. Elam said he always thought Mr. Hoffert's suicide was strange in
relation to Ms. Henneman's disappearance, but the trial team chose not to
use it. Mr. Elam reiterated that he could not find Ms. Muncie, although he
had very much wanted to interview her, and asked that I let him know
what I found out ifI got in touch with her.
When I asked Mr. Elam whether he recalled Ms. Lewis telling him she
heard Ms. Muncie say anything about Mr. Hoffert raping a girl, Mr. Elam
did not recall the statement. Mr. Elam said if Ms. Lewis had made such a
statement to him, it was probably because of a lack of specificity in
referring to a 'girl' that caused him not to follow up.

On January 24, 2007, I contacted Mr. Elam to ask if he would be willing
to sign an affidavit stating the following:
Mr. Elam interviewed Lisa Lewis on August 12, 2004, and
obtained information about Erick Hall, Lynn Henneman, and
Patrick Hoffert.
Mr. Elam attempted to locate and interview Deirdre Muncie, but
was unsuccessful in doing so.
On February 9, 2007, Mr. Elam contacted me and stated that he could only
sign an affidavit if the lead attorney on the case for the Ada County Public
Defenders, Ami! Myshin, approved such an action.
Mr. Myshin did not respond to my efforts to contact him.
(R 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573 (emphasis added) (Exhibit 13, Appendix 11, pp.l-3).)
On September 17, 2007, the district court entered a written order denying
Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn, stating that "[n]o showing has been made by the
petitioner that [the] deposition is necessary to protect his substantial rights." (R. 35055
Vol. VI, p.l 046.)
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A month later, the court held a hearing and denied Mr. Hall's motion for
permission to appeal from the bench. During that hearing, the district court expounded
upon its reasons for denying the deposition of Mr. Elam, and commented on Mr. Shaw's
affidavit.
THE COURT: ... Counsel seem to be saying, in effect, since Mr. Elam
won't sign the affidavit we drafted for him, we want to put him through a
deposition. Seems to be kind of a -- you know, almost a punishment....
But we need diligent trial counsel to be willing -- who are competent, and
professional, and diligent, and energetic to be willing to do this work...
And if -- if we start putting their staff -- staffs and staff members through
full blown depositions, I just worry whether, in the long run, anybody is
going to be willing to do this work, and I mean on the defense side, of a
capital case. And I'm concerned about that. And I'll admit to you that has
-- is part of my -- is part of what I've considered, in the whole world of
things I've considered. This work is essential. If we drive good, diligent
defense lawyers out of the business, because they don't want to be
harassed in each and every case, and have all members of their staff
harassed with depositions, without any indication of why it's appropriate,
we're going to have people left, only people left, who don't have other
choices for what they can do for a living. . .. I'm looking at an affidavit
of Michael -- Michael J. Shaw, who is an investigator for the State
Appellate Public Defender's Office, Capital Litigation Unit. ... where he
says - [")Mr. Elam contacted me and stated he could only sign an affidavit
if the lead attorney on the case, for the Ada County Public Defender, Ami!
Myshin, approved such action.[") You know, there are conditions to his
employment. He's got to work, he's -- he's got to -- got to make a living.
. . . And so saying somebody was, quote, not fully cooperative, referring
to -- close quote, referring to Mr. Elam, because he won't sign your
affidavit ... I just think that that's hyperbole, that's an overstatement, to
say that Mr. Elam has not been fully cooperative. There's been no real
evidence, before me, of that.
(Tr. 11115/07, p.l7, L.l6 - p.21, L.23.)
To obtain court-ordered discovery, a petitioner must identify specific areas
wherein discovery is requested, and explain why those areas are necessary to protect his
substantial rights. Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001)
("Unless discovery is necessary to protect an applicant's substantial rights, the district
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court is not required to order discovery."); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d
749 (Ct. App. 1999). Mr. Hall submits that under the circumstances of this case, he has
made a sufficient showing of relevance and necessity such that his requested discovery
was mandatory.
Alternatively, Mr. Hall submits the district court erred in exercising its discretion
by misapplying the relevant law and facts. As to the law, in denying Mr. Hall's request
for a court-ordered deposition of Mr. Elam, the district court repeatedly emphasized
Mr. Elam's role as an investigator, not a lawyer. (Tr. 1/16/07, p.32, Ls.18-19 ("But the
claim is to ineffective assistance of counsel, not of their investigator."); Tr. 8/08/07, p.65,
1.24 - p.66, 1.2 ("it's obvious he's not a decision-maker on what evidence was introduce
or known or not known, known about and not introduced.").) The district court failed to

appreciate that, as a matter of law, a complete understanding of the scope of counsels'
investigation is necessary to assess their performance. See e.g., Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 690-691 (1984) ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or
to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.");
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (noting that when assessing counsel's

choices, courts should first focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable). As
trial counsels' investigator, Glenn E1am played an integral part in Mr. Hall's
representation during the underlying criminal proceedings, and is in the best position to
describe the nature and scope of his investigative efforts.

Accordingly, an essential

component of post-conviction counsels' investigation included interviewing Mr. E1am.
See Hertz, R., and Liebman, J., Federal Habeas Comus Practice and Procedure (Fifth

Ed.), pp.533-536 n.25 (noting that an investigator is a potential source of information for
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claims of "ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to pretrial investigation.").

Mr. Hall demonstrated to the district court that trial counsel could not provide either a
complete or accurate description of their investigation. Thus, the district court's denial of

Mr. Hall's request to depose Mr. Elarn prevents Mr. Hall from fully developing his
claims. See Coleman v. Zant, 708 F.2d 541, 548 (11th Cir. 1983) (relying in part on the
denial of depositions at the state post-conviction level in finding that federal habeas
petitioner had been denied a full and fair opportunity to develop facts to support his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); see generally Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002,
1009 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Denial of an opportunity for discovery is an abuse of discretion
when the discovery is necessary to fully develop the facts of a claim." (citation
omitted)·i O
As to the facts, the district court erroneously found Mr. Elam had been fully
cooperative with Mr. Hall's investigation, despite multiple assertions by post-conviction
counsel, and even a sworn statement from their investigator, that Mr. Elam had provided
relevant and necessary infonnation to further his claims, but had refused to sign an
affidavit. (Tr. 11115/07, p.21, Ls.20-23 ("1 just think that that's hyperbole, that's an
overstatement, to say that Mr. Elam has not been fully cooperative. There's been no real
evidence, before me, ofthat.").) Moreover, the district court relied on its erroneous, or at
least irrelevant belief that if it ordered a deposition of Mr. Elam in this case, then
competent defense lawyers and their investigators would not handle future capital cases.
(Tr. 11/15/07, p.l8, Ls.13-20 ("if we start putting their staff ... through fuJI blown

Both Coleman v. Zant and Jones v. Wood addressed the rules governing discovery in
federal habeas corpus proceedings.
10
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depositions, I just worry whether, in the long run, anybody is going to be willing to do
this work . . . is part of what I've considered, in the whole world of things I've
considered.").) Thus, the district court's decision was not consistent with applicable legal
standards or a sound factual analysis. For these reasons, Mr. Hall submits the district
court abused its discretion.
As a final matter, in his memorandum in support of his motion for discovery,
Mr. Hall asserted that because this is a capital case, the district court should liberally
allow discovery of all relevant requested information. (R. 35055 Vol. VIII, p.1573
(Exhibit 2, p. 7).) It does not appear this Court has ever addressed whether capital cases
should be treated any differently than non-capital cases for purposes of post-conviction
discovery. In this appeal, Mr. Hall maintains that due to the heightened protections
afforded by the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment to capital defendants
generally, a district court should exercise its discretion liberally in favor of disclosure
when discovery is not otherwise mandatory. See, e.g.. Payne v. Bell, 89 F. Supp. 2d 967,
971 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (recognizing that "more liberal discovery is appropriate in capital
cases where the stakes for petitioner are so high." (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978).) Mr. Hall submits this Court should adopt a "good cause" standard for
discovery in capital cases. Under such a standard, a petitioner "need not show that the
additional discovery would definitely lead to relief. Rather, he need only show good
cause that the evidence sought would lead to relevant evidence regarding his petition."
Payne, 89 F.Supp.2d at 970. Alternatively, Mr. Hall asserts because this is a capital case,

that fact should at least be considered when district courts exercise their discretion under
the Raudebaugh standard.
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D.

Conclusion
Mr. Hall has a substantial interest in supporting his claims for post-conviction

relief. In this case, a deposition of Mr. Elam appears to be the only way to obtain all the
information necessary to fully support Mr. Hall's claims. Accordingly, for the reasons
stated above, Mr. Hall submits he is entitled to a court ordered deposition of Mr. Elam.
Alternatively, Mr. Hall submits that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
request to depose Mr. Elaru.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's orders
denying his motion for juror contact and to depose Mr. Elam, and remand this case for
further investigation and proceedings.
Dated this 25 th day of June, 2009.
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